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AbstrAct In this paper the behavior of economic actors with goods of uncertain 
quality is examined from the perspective of the sociology of markets. The analysis 
uses the findings of in-depth interviews conducted in 2011 and 2012 amongst small 
and medium-size company entrepreneurs working in the construction industry. 
In the Hungarian construction industry neither formal rules nor vocational 
chambers are able to create a safe environment for entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, 
networks created as a result of a series of micro-selection steps might be able to 
encourage the enforcement of the quality of services, the observation of deadlines 
and what is more, ensure payment discipline. In this market, the typically high 
level of risk that exists can be reduced by relationships. Networks also reduce the 
cost of transactions since a major part of the services in this field could only be 
standardized at significant cost. 
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INTRODUCTION
The authors conducted research in two settlements of the central region of 
Hungary in 2011 and 20123. The interviews were conducted with company 
owners, managers and self-employed entrepreneurs and represented various 
construction industry trades4. We were interested in the procedures for 
cooperation that were created between the actors in the economy, and how 
they could manage to prevent and mitigate the effect of the economic recession 
with the help of their network and trust relations. During this research effort 
we found that the crisis had fundamentally reshaped the formerly-established 
relations of entrepreneurs. On the one hand, as a result of shrinking demand, 
a few of them were only able to get orders if they could make transactions 
outside of their networks which ensured the safety of their business. On the 
other hand, ‘internal splits’ had occurred inside their networks of relatives, 
close friends and acquaintances mainly because of financial non-performance. 
Additionally, several of them had closed their enterprises and gone abroad to 
work and had abandoned their networks. 
The withdrawal and exchange of the actors modified not only the formerly-
established networks but – of course, not independently – disarranged supply. 
Unreliable and at the same time barely controllable (in terms of quality) 
services appeared on the market. As a consequence of sharp competition, 
entrepreneurs sometimes appeared offering unrealistic low price and 
unfeasibly short deadlines for completing work. We highlight later in the 
paper that prices lost their role of carrying information (which was already 
unreliable) and construction industry services became more uncertain in 
terms of quality. 
Thus the networks of entrepreneurs changed significantly as an effect of 
the economic crisis. The turbulent changes observed urge us to analyze not 
only the crisis mitigation effects of the relationships but to make an attempt 
to explore the logics of network formation at a more abstract level. Besides 
this, the recession made it more evident that the operation of the construction 
industry segment of the market – and the operation of other service markets 
3  The research described in this paper was supported by the TÁMOP-4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-
005 project. 
4  The research field was Albertirsa, where Lilla Tóth started to conduct research from the 
beginning of 1990 in several waves. Her findings have been published in various journals 
(Tóth 1999; Tóth 2005; Tóth 2006). We met 16 entrepreneurs in Albertirsa (four of them had 
also been interviewed previously). Besides these respondents, there were four entrepreneurs 
interviewed in Pilis close to Albertirsa. 
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as well – has characteristics which also exist in periods of prosperity which 
are less salient but become emphasized in times of crisis, and in this way 
become more visible. Quality is not equally measurable and standardizable 
for all kinds of goods (North 1990); on the contrary, there are goods and 
services about which it cannot be stated with complete certainty that they 
are worth their price. For instance, if we are lucky we may never realize how 
amateurishly pipework has been fitted in a wall. The fact that customers in 
certain segments of the market buy ‘a pig in a poke’ increases the cost of 
transactions, which has an impact on the organization and operation of these 
markets and influences the behavior of actors (not only buyers but also sellers 
who offer better quality services). 
In this paper we first discuss the situation of the Hungarian construction 
industry. Later, using our interview experience we analyze the regulatory 
environment of that particular market segment. In the second part of the 
paper, we introduce several characteristics of the non-standardized goods 
market segment. 
THE CRISIS IN THE HUNGARIAN CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY
The construction industry and its related trades have their own special 
risk factors. Even nowadays, despite the improvements in technologies and 
procedures, most labor in construction project is seasonal, which – because 
weather imposes strict deadlines and conditions – implies significant extra 
expenditure (organization, overtime, irregular shifts). A further risk is that 
investment is primarily transaction-specific and service companies cannot 
sell the results of their work to anyone else. This transaction-specific feature 
applies to the customer as well – after a certain period of time they can change 
partners only at significant cost.5 In the construction industry the creation of 
the end product always happens in newer and newer “workshops” which are 
connected to the construction site through the participation of economically 
independent enterprises whose work is characterized by very strong 
interdependency and a badly-performing unit – that often does poor work that 
cannot be corrected – may destroy the quality of the end product. 
Additional uncertainty is generated by the fact that the order of the different 
phases of work is rather rigid (tiling should be preceded by installation of 
wires into the wall, etc.). Planning ahead is hampered by the fact that the 
5 On the cost of changing partners, see Gereffy –Sturgeon 2005.
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different phases of work are done by independent enterprises which are often 
involved in other projects and have various working cultures. As a result, the 
danger of not meeting deadlines is always present, and when this happens it 
upsets not only the final deadline of the given project but the timetables of 
co-entrepreneurs as well.6 
The relatively high proportion of private orders in the construction industry 
probably fosters the prevailing presence of ‘black’ labor which hampers 
regulation in that segment market. ‘Chain debt’ – the many decades old 
practice of non-payment of subcontractors – and corruption7 make orientation 
in the market more difficult. Because of the above-mentioned risks there is 
an increased need to control actors and exclude persons who have infringed 
norms and/or who are unqualified.
In the Hungarian construction industry market the legal framework of 
the sector is defined by ‘Étv’ (Act LXXVIII of 1997 on the Formation and 
Protection of the Built Environment, amended on 1st January 2011 and on 
1st January 2012 respectively). Maintenance of quality and the meeting of 
standards are to be ensured by the fact that most construction industry work 
is possible only with a permit, partly through the approval of plans by the 
various responsible authorities (National Disaster Management, State Public 
Health Office, National Nature Conservation, etc.). Certain work tasks on the 
construction site should be completed according to working drawings and 
relevant professional standards. The ‘construction record’ is an important 
document about the construction for which records are kept about the tasks 
accomplished by the participants involved in the project on a particular day.8
The responsible technical manager employed by the contractors, and the 
technical controller representing the investors are crucial elements of the 
regulation and quality assurance procedure. Their competence must be proven 
by practical experience and references. Their official license to practice and 
their authorization are given by vocational chambers and organizations 
which provide guarantees to consigners. The technical manager carries out 
the function of internal auditor; he or she approves the construction work 
6  Eccles (1982) depicted the characteristics and high cooperation needs of the construction 
industry in the same way (see his research into the American construction industry).
7  http://www.transparancy.hu/uploads/docs/CPI2012_map_and_country_results.pdf 
Downloaded: 30/12/2012. 
8  Decree 313/2012. (XI.8.) on the Documentation and Information Centre of Construction and 
the National Construction Register mandates the use of E(lectronic) – construction records; that 
is, E-construction logs. The entries of the E-construction record cannot be changed later and 
thus they decrease the opportunity for corruption. Construction and other authorities and the 
National Tax and Customs Office also have direct access to E-construction logs. 
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with his/her signature. The technical controller takes over the work from 
the contractor for the investor, provided that it is in accordance with plans, 
contract, and standards. 
Thus it may appear that construction industry work is well-regulated and 
sufficiently documented. However, in practice the professional considerations 
of the actors responsible for the quality can be overwritten by loyalty towards 
employers and certainly by personal self-interests as well. When savings 
need to be made, or when under pressure, the contractor often dispenses with 
quality standards and the technical manager who is loyal to his employer 
usually demurs, especially when he is directly or indirectly motivated 
to do so. In doing this he also takes a risk as he might lose his technical 
managerial license, though there is only a very small chance of this. In theory, 
the technical controller is employed by the investor in principle so that he 
accepts a piece of work only when the prescribed quality has been reached. 
In practice, the consigner often expects him to make various claims about 
the dubious quality of the work in order to that they can make excuses not 
to pay the contractor. However, there are also cases when they will accept 
work of questionable quality in return for slush money from the counter 
party. According to our interviewees, local technical controllers can be bribed 
with only a few exceptions. Only entrepreneurs, well-provided with capital, 
are able to influence technical controllers, but these entrepreneurs are not 
necessarily in need of orders offered under poor financial conditions. 
Public procurement tenders mostly benefit larger companies and their 
owners will not suffer losses, even when demand/prices are low. It often 
happens that tenders are won with an unrealistically low bid; it is known from 
the very beginning that it is not possible to complete a project at the required 
quality, and to pay rates, taxes and contribution extras for the amount that is 
bid. Several primary contractors solve that problem by deciding in advance 
not to pay their subcontractors off. It often happens that a primary contractor, 
knowing in advance that he will not pay, pre-plans his own bankruptcy 
and business closure, leaving no legal successor. According to one of our 
interviewees, “first, the end of the food chain starves to death”. In these cases 
– since there is a written contract and the completion of work is documented – 
there is a legal remedy available. In the service market for private individuals 
there is no such option since the interested parties do not enter into a contract, 
do not register the works completed in a record and they rarely employ a 
technical manager.
The case is more favorable when a new property is built, since it is bound to 
be registered which implies that the work of the entrepreneurs working on the 
site should be legal as well. However, refurbishments and small re-building 
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projects are outside the official area of control so in these cases informal 
regulation, which could make unwritten agreements enforceable, is especially 
important 
Since the transition the Hungarian construction industry market has been 
characterized by two types of market crises; the first of which is market 
turbulence (Laki 2011). Until the second half of the first decade of the new 
millennium, more and more actors appeared in the growing markets and they 
did not always comply with existing rules. They reinterpreted and reformed 
them, thus increasing uncertainty and risk. The present market turbulence 
in the contracting market is manifested on the one hand by sharp price 
competition (observe the unrealistically low bids for public procurement 
tenders), and on the other hand (and in contrast), by the emergence of cartels. 
The irrationally high prices promoted by cartels will not yield higher, better 
quality since because of inertia the system continues to work in the usual 
way. The phenomena of the deterioration of quality and the rise of chain debts 
indicate the disintegration and dysfunction of tacit regulation. 
The state of a county’s construction industry is strongly bound to the 
general investment situation, and increases and decreases in investment have 
a decisive impact on the construction industry. Whatever the situation may 
be, the profit to be made is significant, though there is high risk in this sector. 
There are many investments made into the construction industry, which means 
the sector appeals to many. In Hungary, demand was the determining driving 
force for the development of this industry. At the end of 2012 the output of 
the construction industry was 40 percent less than it was in 2005, while the 
number of construction enterprises had hardly decreased at all. The number of 
home construction industry enterprises is approximately 90 thousand. These 
enterprises are small in term of size and are deficient in funds. According to 
the interviewers, for small entrepreneurs the most frequent way to escape 
bankruptcy and unemployment is to get employment abroad. In the home 
building market the outlook for the future is best characterized by the number 
of building permits approved, which has decreased to a quarter (nationwide 
total, 7800) of the amount approved in 1998.9
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MARKETS
In his book ‘The Architecture of Markets’ (2001) Fligstein looked for the 
answer to the question what factors determine the behavior of economic 
9 Data source: KSH (Central Statistical Office) 
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actors. In accordance with the findings of representatives10 of economic 
sociology that are considered classics, he questions the fact that enterprises 
exclusively respond to prices. In his book he gives a wide overview of the 
different level regulatory environments that shape economic activities. These 
are partly created by politics. On the other hand, they are also established 
inside the economic sphere itself. Fligstein works out the latter – relying 
on Bourdieu’s field theory – from the structural features of the markets. 
According to his analysis, in each segment of the market the most influential 
and largest companies are able to maintain their positions since they can 
impose the rules of the game that they create on other enterprises – basically, 
limiting competition. 
Fligstein’s influential work gave impetus to research designed to explore 
the sociology of markets. The author and his colleague found it necessary 
to overview and systematize the rather great number of papers created on 
this subject matter containing various approaches (Fligstein – Dauter 2007) 
several years after their original work had been published. In this paper they 
still interpret the market as a field where transactions are determined by 
formal and informal rules. Regulation can be created at three levels: the first 
is the level of formal rules that is the legal environment of transactions; the 
second includes codes of conduct and recommendations about quality and 
the qualification of various professional organizations and chambers (or in 
the case of co-operatives, written rules); finally, the third level concerns tacit 
agreements. 
In the next section we briefly summarize our research experience regarding 
the above-mentioned levels of the regulatory environment. 
Dominant firms dictate the rules of market segments
Following our experience we agree with the above-outlined findings of 
Fligstein. The competition-limiting activities of dominant firms – due to 
the serious crisis in the construction industry – do apply to most enterprises 
because they themselves have an interest in maintaining the status quo rather 
than in transacting business which might improve their position but which 
is definitely riskier. Our interviewees – in order to maintain their stability 
– withdrew without hesitation from business opportunities that offered a 
10  We mention here only the two emblematic and probably the most frequently-cited authors of 
this approach in order to avoid presenting a long reference list: Coleman 1988; Granovetter 
1985. 
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higher level of profit in favor of transactions that yielded a more predictable 
level of profit (especially when they did not have enough information about 
their potential partners). During our interviews it was often mentioned that a 
certain business seemed to be a good deal and would have provided long-term 
work, but the respondent did not dare to take it on because they did not know 
anything about the partner. 
At the same time our findings are different from Fligstein’s description 
of the structure of the markets in two ways. On the one hand, not all of 
the enterprises in the domestic construction industry work according to 
rules dictated by the biggest companies. Our interviewees, almost without 
exception, could be characterized by their efforts to try to cut themselves free 
from the big dominant companies; a goal which they successfully achieved in 
most instances through organizing themselves into networks. They create and 
maintain their own network rules and only in the worst cases (for example, if 
they cannot get orders any other way) do they manage transactions outside of 
the market segment that is covered by their relationships. As a result of this, 
the larger companies that have a monopolistic position are able to extend their 
power only over those enterprises which are excluded from these networks. 
Additionally, they do so not through limiting and controlling the competition 
but through doing the opposite: boosting it. They do not limit competition 
despite the fact that price competition leads to the (for them, negative) 
selection of other subcontractors, and, in the long run to the deterioration of 
the quality of the services they provide. 
Thus the economic actors in the construction industry market do not behave 
exclusively according to the rules dictated by the big companies. Two – 
barely overlapping – market institutions have been developed. One comprises 
larger companies; the other includes the regulatory environment created and 
maintained by the networks that contain small and medium-size enterprises. 
These two fields indicate the distinct and obvious divergence in habits and 
norms regarding payment discipline, quality, meeting of deadlines, and the 
timing and coordination of the work of the respective trades. 
The level of formal rules
At the beginning of our paper we briefly outlined the legal environment 
which regulates the market segment of the construction industry. We collected 
rich material about the potential of formal regulation. Now we highlight only 
one aspect of this; chain debt, which may be the most serious problem for 
entrepreneurs. Chain debt has been ranked among the most serious problems 
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of the construction industry during the last 20 years, yet as a result of the 
economic crisis the number of people involved, and the amount of irrevocable 
debts, have both increased.  
From the 20 self-employed individuals interviewed, almost all reported to 
having suffered losses arising through unpaid debt. One of our interviewees 
estimated that his losses reached 20 percent of his return. The losses suffered 
naturally depend on turnover and returns; enterprises that provide repairing 
and fitting services for private individuals logically reported irrevocable 
losses of ‘only’ a couple of thousand HUF (10-20 EUR). However, those who 
belong to these circles are not always secure. For instance, one of the self-
employed persons (a plumber and gas-fitter) did not receive remuneration for 
a job but was unable to escape only with this indignity since the customer 
ordered further work several months later which the contractor did not dare to 
refuse, even though he knew that he would not be paid again due to the threat 
of force characteristic of the mafia. However, this case is not common. It does 
indicate, however, that the presence of formal rules does not ensure the safety 
of entrepreneurs. 
In our sample, losses of 4-5 million HUF (16-17 thousand EUR) per firm 
are typical; however, one entrepreneur (specialized in electrical installations 
and safety appliances) was reportedly cheated out of 100 million HUF by his 
business partner. The above-mentioned 4-5 million of irrevocable losses are 
mostly the result of a single case (losses which did not amount to 200-300 
thousand HUF were described as ‘business as usual’ by our interviewees), 
and did not represent an accumulation of various debts. Occasionally, it also 
occurred that an entrepreneur suffered ‘chain accidents’. For instance, the 
owner of one of the electrical companies invested all his liquid money – 12 
million HUF – into material and wages for the people employed in a major 
order, yet he did not get compensated for his labor and investment. However, 
since his invoices were accepted by the customer, his VAT debt rose to more 
than 6 million HUF, which he was not able to pay off, thus the tax office 
mortgaged this amount on his house. In order to extricate himself from his 
troubles he gave up his independence and took up a new position in Germany 
as an employee at a Hungarian prime contractor. There the contractor gave 
him wages at the beginning but after a while he was only offered promises. 
In the end he left the company with 2.5 million HUF of debt outstanding 
(the same thing happened to another 20 employees). Altogether he is owed 
approximately 70 thousand EUR, which he has little chance of getting back. 
None of the interviewed, despite the fact that they had lost a lot, undertook 
legal action to recover their assets. They unanimously explained this decision 
by pointing to poor legal regulation and slow administration of justice. They 
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considered that their debtors were able to avoid being called to account 
through with the exploitations of legal loopholes (for example, by declaring 
themselves bankrupt and launching their businesses again under a different 
name). The majority could not even afford to enter into a correct and detailed 
contract that would provide protection because of the transactional costs of 
this procedure, and because their customers would not consent to this kind of 
agreement. For example, one of our partners did not get his money in time 
because his customer always found new faults with his work (which he had 
done according to plan) could not prove his case due to the lack of a properly 
detailed contract (moreover, the limited contract that did exist was signed 
when he was already hard at work on the construction site).
We also asked our interviewees whether they paid their employees or 
subcontractors when they themselves did not get their money from the primary 
contractor. Their answer was an affirmative yes which seems plausible since 
they get orders via their relationships (we return to this issue shortly), and 
tacit agreements play a significant role in the establishment of the safety of 
enterprises. As a result of this, nobody takes the risk of squandering his hard-
accumulated social capital for the sake of temporary benefits. Of course it 
occurred that some contractors were unable to pay off their employees since 
they themselves could not get their money, but these kinds of delays were 
understood and tolerated by partners inside the network. 
The level of vocational chambers and professional organizations
During the years after the transition chaos characterized several market 
segments in Hungary. This was due to rocketing demand for certain services 
and goods which resulted in the appearance en masse of services and goods of 
doubtable quality. For example, it was possible to travel to western countries 
after 1989, and there was no obstacle to establishing business relationships 
with foreign partners either. At this time many people wanted to learn 
foreign languages – mostly English. As a consequence of increased demand, 
language schools mushroomed, many of which provided low quality services: 
they did not employ properly qualified teachers, did not have well-equipped 
classrooms, and in order to increase their incomes they inflated the number 
of participants in lessons, etc. The professional language schools – which 
naturally worked at a higher cost – struggled in this chaos. The market was 
disorganized and characterized by sharp price competition due to the fact that 
customers were attracted to schools – since they lacked any other information 
– primarily because of prices. Finally, the situation was solved by the creation 
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of a professional organization which issued quality certificates to companies 
that met professional criteria (e.g. those that had qualified teachers and limited 
the number of students in groups). Thus customers could choose between 
service providers not on the criterion of price alone, but through considering 
information concerning the quality of the service as well (Laki 2006). 
In contrast to foreign language teaching, the market in the construction 
industry remained chaotic after the transition. The reason for this, besides 
the deficiencies of formal regulation, was the inefficiency of professional 
organizations (it should be noted that most private customers prefer to buy 
the cheapest services, and thus even if vocational chambers issued quality 
recommendations, they would not be accepted anyway). The owner of an 
electrical company complained that he had little chance of getting orders 
from private customers since he maintained professional standards and 
installed materials and parts which were naturally more expensive. As a 
consequence, he could not compete with enterprises that employed black 
labor and used cheap Chinese appliances. It is worth noting that customers 
are not so understanding about poor quality in every market; see for instance 
the example of language teaching. 
It was the unanimous opinion of our interviewees that national vocational 
organizations do not have any impact on their work; several of them did not 
even know about the existence of these organizations. Some interviewees 
raised the idea that these organizations might have an important role if, 
for example, they could compile blacklists of entrepreneurs who work in a 
professionally reprehensible way or do not adhere to terms of payment, and 
this would significantly increase the safety of transactions. 
Local professional organizations do not have a substantial effect on the 
work of those who were interviewed in our small sample. This is on the one 
hand due to the fact that amongst the 20 interviewed entrepreneurs there 
was only one landscape gardener and one plumber who lived exclusively 
through local orders. The others typically got orders from across the entire 
country and several of them even got work from abroad. Correspondingly, 
local organizations did not have the correct perspective about their work. On 
the other hand, as a result of the crisis the recognized and highly-respected 
entrepreneurs who could have taken a role in professional organizations 
in relatively high numbers gave up their independence and went abroad to 
work. At the same time the amount of black labor increased, and vocational 
chambers were not able to regulate or diminish it. Thus the organizations in the 
examined settlement, the Hungarian Association of Craftmens’ Corporations 
(IPOSZ) and the National Federation of Traders and Caterers (KISOSZ) – 
which were prestigious and influential at the time of the transition – have 
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became insignificant (Tóth 2007). The membership of the once-250 strong 
IPOSZ has decreased to 30; those in authority have aged and now it essentially 
works as a nostalgia or pensioners’ club. 
The level of tacit agreements
It is today a commonplace in the ABC of economic sociology that networks 
play a decisive role in economic life. It was surprising to find out that, in the 
examined construction industry segment, sellers and buyers find each other 
almost exclusively via their personal relationships. As far as was possible, 
we asked our interviewees how they had got orders during the last 3-5 years. 
It rarely occurred that someone had done business with an entrepreneur who 
was formerly a stranger. Some of them had experimented with advertisements 
but they had not yielded any results and were regarded as money thrown 
down the drain. It is important to note that in the construction industry it is 
not only sellers but also buyers that get services via their acquaintances. For 
the latter – because of the characteristics of the construction industry market 
– networks are practically the most significant guarantees of quality of service 
(we analyze this issue later in connection with the market for non-standard 
services).
From the literature, Elinor Ostrom (1990) may be the most striking proponent 
of the idea that is not the state or any other center but local communities that 
are able to regulate transactions most effectively. Her examples (Swiss forest 
communities, Spanish and Sri Lankan irrigation communities, etc.) apply 
to local and/or ethnically homogenous groups almost without exception. 
It seems that a prerequisite for rule-compliant behavior is the existence of 
communities with traditions and tight bonds. These rules may be developed 
historically, but in a stable community they could also be created during 
negotiation and bargaining, as Ostrom demonstrated in connection with the 
case of the Alanyan fishermen. 
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In contrast to the local, closed communities she describes, the circle 
of construction industry market actors is liable to change: concerning any 
period of time there are many entrants and leave-takers; some enterprises are 
launched and others close down and changing partners is a common practice, 
thus the opportunity for tacit agreements differs from the case of forest or 
irrigation communities.11
Our observations indicate that, despite such changes, a circle of those who 
still manage to make repeated transactions can be created. It is important to 
highlight that not only can strategic relationships be created between these 
actors – as is known from the literature (Axelrod 1984) – which means more 
than simply surmounting immediate interests, yielding long term profit and 
mutual benefits and staying inside an economically rational trust-based 
framework 12, but utilitarian relations can also be established. The relationships 
may expand and deepen: communities can develop in a similar way as Ostrom 
describes. The members of such communities are able to control transactions 
and impose sanctions against opportunist behavior more effectively compared 
to communities that operate on the basis of strategic relations. Eccless (1982) 
called the relatively permanent co-operation strategies of independent 
enterprises that develop during repeated transactions ‘quasi integrations’ or 
‘quasi firms’. In the North American construction industry market that he 
11  The common goods analyzed by Ostrom, especially the notion of the ‘commons’ of natural 
resources and markets, have shared features. Free riders can cause not only a ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ but a ‘tragedy of markets’ as well when their work results in a loss of general 
confidence in connection with certain goods and services which results in a drop in demand. 
Some market segments can also be entered by entrepreneurs who cheat customers and offer 
services of questionable quality. Competition is not always capable of selecting out free riders 
(when a product is non-replaceable, or when it is not possible to send reliable signals to 
customers) and thus there will always be more economic actors who are encouraged to enter 
a certain area, as we saw in connection with the above-mentioned example of the language 
schools. In certain cases, competitive markets close down (Bara 1999); for example, Budapest 
taxi entrepreneurs will not enter other areas despite their losses because their capital (their cars 
and local knowledge) is not investable in other areas. As a result of this, competition increases 
in an overpopulated market and incomes decrease, which leads to decreases in quality (cars are 
changed less frequently, less is spent on technical maintenance). This does not automatically 
entail the loss of customers, since passengers may recognize only too late when they are 
making use of the service that quality is poor. Miller (1992) conducted a systematic review 
of market failures. In this paper – in contrast to Miller – we point out that hierarchy is not 
the only solution to market failures; problems can also be solved with regulation. There is no 
generally-applicable recipe for this approach as the state, vocational organizations, networks 
of entrepreneurs or a combination of these vary by market segment. 
12  There is more to this than the notion of trust, as described by Sako (1992). Neither trust in 
contractual matters nor competencies is typical of business life. 
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examined he found that in the cases when there was no institutional regulation 
(with the exception of state, municipal or federal investments where public 
tenders are mandatory), the relationships between the prime contractor of a 
construction and his subcontractors was stable and continuous and was rarely 
established via public tender. 
The basis for formation of a community is the fact that, for a certain 
proportion of sellers and buyers, it is characteristic (as was highlighted by 
Sahlins [1972:185] in connection with the analysis of exchanges) that giving 
presents yields friendships, and friendships incite present-giving. These 
findings, with certain modifications, coincide with our experiences of research. 
Our interviewees, one after another, said that many of their interactions ended 
up in friendships, which in turn brought new orders. One of  them reported to 
getting orders in the following way: “I heard about this deal from my friend 
(we are talking about installing some electrics in a church). Anyway, I met 
this friend of mine because someone else recommended that I do the electrical 
work in his house. During the work we became friends. I met a lot of people 
via fitting who later recommended me to other people. I have lots of friends 
whom I am going to invite to my 40th birthday party.” Our findings are not 
unique; they reflect the traditional values of rural Hungary. Uzzi concluded 
with similar ideas about a circle of New York entrepreneurs involved in the 
fashion business. One of his interviewees stated: “It is hard for an outsider 
to see that you become friends with these people-business friends. You trust 
them and their work. You have an interest in what they’re doing outside of 
business” (Uzzi 1997:42).
In his paper Uzzi interprets the relationships of entrepreneurs using the 
concept of embeddedness, which we only partly agree with. Granovetter (1985) 
– taking Polanyi’s approach – starts from the fact that the relationship between 
individuals which exists from the beginning and is often institutionalized (for 
example, kinship) exerts an influence on the economic actions of individuals 
and on the forms of firms and also industries. As a consequence, individuals 
who get involved in transactions with each other cannot leave their social 
networks out of account. These can help them, but they can also be obstacles. 
However, Uzzi presents cases similar to ours which were characterized 
exactly by the fact that relations which are clearly economic at the start 
(seller-buyer, customer-contractor) are step by step embedded in their own 
social relations by the repetition of actors’ transactions; for example, they turn 
into friendships. 
Thus, individuals who undertake transactions with each other form their 
relationships concerning not only the expected economic benefits but also 
due to feelings of sympathy and empathy which are in accordance with their 
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social needs as well. These tighter relationships usually qualify as friendships, 
and are symbolically reinforced (our interviewees mentioned going yachting 
together, name-day celebrations, attending the weddings of each others’ 
children), given the proper framework for the development and enforcement 
of tacit agreements. However, good relations are certainly not the automatic 
consequences of otherwise correctly-handled transactions; parties that play 
fair will not necessarily form a friendship. Our interviewees also mentioned 
partners that they had found acceptable regarding their professional learning 
and business honesty, but with whom they still avoided closer co-operation; 
they did not place orders with each other, did not even recommend them to 
customers and did not mix with them outside business since they had different 
opinions about family, consumption, etc. That is to say, they lacked the 
psychological affinity which is a precondition of a good relationship. 
The most pronounced feature of the approach of Zelizer’s oeuvre13 may be 
that, in human relationships, economic, personal (psychological, emotional) 
and value elements are simultaneously present, thus individuals repeatedly 
enter situations where they have to reconcile economic rationality with feelings 
of sympathy, loyalty, friendship and love. In one of our earlier papers (Kuczi 
–Tóth 2012) we called those small scale changes of relationships ‘micro-
selection’ which refers to individuals’ experiences with repeated exchanges. 
The essence of these small changes is that actors strive to reconcile the – 
apparently irreconcilable – economic and social world and thereby establish 
a certain compromise between them which suits their values, attitudes and 
business interests. Successful reconciliation which satisfies both parties in 
the transaction acts to reinforce relationships, while less successful attempts 
weaken it. For example, it is not indifferent from the perspective of the future 
of a relationship how the customer reacts when his subcontractor does not 
meet a deadline. Does he show understanding, or quite the contrary, does 
he decide that on this occasion he does not want to understand his partner’s 
perspective. Their relationship would not necessarily radically change in 
the latter case; it might not cease but its intensity would decrease and would 
be limited primarily to business affairs. However, if the customer shows 
goodwill, the intensity of the relationship might increase and its content might 
be enriched. 
One of our interviewees told a story, an illuminating example of the 
failure to reconcile the economic and private sphere as a consequence of the 
disembeddedness of the network. He related that entrepreneurs that belonged 
to his wide circle of friends had recommended each other to their customers 
13 See the comprehensive volume on her ouvre (Zelizer 2011).
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for a long time. However, this practice had changed recently because several 
of them had decided that asking for commission would not go to the detriment 
of good friendly relations. The ‘guilty parties’ in the course of the time were 
joined by more and more individuals; mostly those from a younger generation. 
With favors turning into business relations, loyal gestures naturally declined 
in frequency and friendly relations, step by step, moved towards relations 
based on interests. In this example the reconciliation of economic and 
private spheres can be considered a failure because the changes proved to be 
counterproductive even from an economic point of view; the group of friends 
decreased in number (our interviewee also left the group) and the number of 
recommendations also decreased. Finally, everyone got fewer orders.14 
Since the changes that accompany individual transactions are mostly small 
scale15 (for instance, as a result of a positive experience we meet someone 
more often or under less formal circumstances), they will not continue to 
result in profound transitions of networks. However, changes, although 
insignificant in themselves, accumulate in the long run and result in a 
perceptible transformation of the network.
The tendency to transformation is discernible ex post: it might lead to the 
homogenization of relations; individuals with different values, characterized 
by different vocational and business approaches may become filtered out 
from a network or be pushed into a peripheral position.16
  As stated above, in Ostrom’s examples the behavior of economic 
actors is monitored (and sanctioned in case of need), by closed, mostly 
ethnically homogenous communities. Our interview experiences showed that 
during the process of micro-selection communities develop which are similar 
to those analyzed by Ostrom, and which are able to supervise transactions. 
14  It has been proven in experiments that when a certain voluntary action (in our case mediation 
between customers based on friendships) is associated with material incentive, commitment 
can decrease which can cause decline  in efficacy (Frey 1994). Zelizer (2011) pointed out this 
relationship in connection with nursing. 
15  There can be, of course, radical changes as well: transactions can be followed by a split 
between partners. In the above-mentioned paper this kind of change to a network is called 
macro-selection. 
16  Homogenization is considered to be the typical direction of relationship development (Kim 
and Aldridge, 2005; Keefer and Knack, 2008). Related to the socialpsychological mechanism 
of the homogenization works of Thibaut and Kelley [1959] Hartfield, Utne and Traupmann 
[1979], Grangberg and King [1980], O’Connell [1984], Condon and Crano [1988] can also be 
mentioned. At the same time it is not indifferent what kinds of reconciliation of the economic 
and personal sphere the homogenization takes place through. As can be seen in the above-
mentioned examples, if homogenization proceeds toward the direction of exclusive economic 
interest, the economic potential of the network might decrease. 
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In this process a duality can be observed. On the one hand, tacit agreements 
are formed during the steps of micro-selection; common standards and norms 
regarding quality, working culture, payment discipline, fairness that can be 
expected and private life, family and how free time is spent come into being, 
and are formulated from transaction to transaction and a group identity is 
formed. One of our interviewees, a plumber, indicated the identities of his 
friends as a circle, five-in-hand, creatively denoting that he was talking about 
mates pulling in the same direction at the same time. On the other hand, 
selection happens and networks become homogenous in accordance with 
understood and commonly-accepted norms.17
Certainly, pleasant human relationships which are regarded as safe are 
associated with business risk, since entrepreneurs feel it impolite to deal 
unscrupulously with their relatives and friends during their transactions. It 
may happen that they do not find the balance in each situation between their 
economic interests, friendships and relations. The owner of a paint shop 
limited the value of goods sold on credit to regular customers to 200 thousand 
HUF, but she made an exception for her brother and gave him 5 million HUF 
worth of paint, plaster, etc., the cost of which, apparently, she is not very 
likely to get back. Two other interviewees were cheated by their business 
partner-friends; others were not paid back by their acquaintances. 
It is important to note that our interviewees stated that they tried to do 
their best to maintain good faith towards their relatives and friends. As long 
as it was possible, they tolerated deviation from any original agreements. 
An understanding of another person’s problems arises also from the fact 
that people who are on good terms know each other’s circumstances better 
and thus may find more excuses to extend terms of payment or tolerate late 
payments (e.g. in cases of recent divorce, unemployment due to illness, etc.). 
Thus, significant risk might arise from having good relationships but the trust 
towards the other person – which has developed through micro-selection – 
gives flexibility to the system since there is no need for detailed contracts and 
duties and obligations can be adjusted easily to changing conditions. 
Almost every one of our respondents had been disappointed at some point. 
In most cases work and/or materials that had been invested in were not paid 
for by partners who were regarded as friends at the time. However, contrasting 
examples also exist – one party in a joint enterprise invested the profits from 
his own business without his partner’s knowledge (the case applied to a 
retail seller of building materials). At the same time, these failures did not 
17  Homogenization – at the level of organizational forms and practices – was introduced by Di 
Maggio and Powel (1983) as institutional isomorphism. 
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stop business relations from turning into personal ones. This phenomenon is 
similar to divorce. An increase in the number of divorces does not mean that 
the institution of marriage is in crisis. In fact, it shows – in a certain sense – its 
popularity; after all, people keep trying even after repeated failure.
We have outlined above that in the Hungarian construction industry neither 
formal rules nor vocational chambers or professional organizations are able to 
create a safe environment for entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, networks created 
as a result of micro-selection might be better able to enforce the quality of 
services, ensure that deadlines are kept, and what is more, ensure payment 
discipline. In the following section of the paper we examine the market for 
poorly measurable (non-standardized) goods, and point out that the high levels 
of risk that are typical of this field can be reduced through relationships, or 
rather through the existence of convincing quality indicators for enterprises. 
THE FEATURES OF THE NON-STANDARDIZED 
QUALITY GOODS MARKET 
Customers’ opportunities for getting information vary in each segment of 
the market. The buying and selling of standardized goods is characterized by 
the most clear cut situation. If the goods in question are the same in every 
sense, competition between producers or service providers will be limited to 
price (Svedberg 2003, Aspers 2010) and customers will orient their decisions 
based on this factor, since making a comparison between different goods of the 
same type is unnecessary. However, customers can be exposed to risk even in 
the case of making purchases of standardized goods as they can make typical 
mistakes. Bar-Gill (2007), for example, when analyzing the credit card market, 
proved that customers favor ‘bargain’ short-term (half year) credit which has 
a much higher rate of interest after the initial period expires to longer-term 
but slightly more expensive offers. Individuals mainly take on too much risk 
with this decision because they erroneously assume that they will be able to 
refrain from making purchases on credit after the expiration of the favorable 
interest period. The promise of refunds might also lead to customers making 
mistakes on the goods market. Customers are prone to choosing sellers who 
offer products for sale at a higher price with a bonus thrown in which makes 
the purchase cheaper than the market price when the bonus is cashed in. The 
sellers base their offers on their experience that there will be enough customers 
that cannot resist such a favorable offer; however, at the end many customers 
will not benefit from the refund. Thus, customers can make mistakes even in 
the market of well identifiable standardized goods where the task is relatively 
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simple since there is typically a sufficient amount of information. These 
mistakes cannot be eliminated by market competition which is (also) designed 
to broaden the information base of customers. Moreover, as is highlighted by 
Bar-Gill, sellers base their marketing strategies exactly on these mistakes. 
With the market of non-standardized goods, customers have less opportunity 
to gather information. Since they cannot obtain clear cut indications about the 
quality of goods and services (because there are none), they learn too late, 
only after the transaction, what they have actually paid for. For instance, two 
estimates for the cost of redecorating may be the same, but the final quality 
in terms of durability can be significantly different: in one case the paint job 
may last two years; in the other the flat may only need to be painted seven 
years later. Here customers’ decisions are inevitably more risky compared to 
purchases made in markets for standardized goods. This kind of uncertainty 
is also characteristic of a significant number of the transactions that take 
place in the construction industry market. Before going into detail, we now 
briefly touch upon the segments of markets of non-standardized goods where 
uniqueness and the impossibility of comparison with others does not cause 
any problem, but on the contrary; creates value. 
Customers may in certain cases get information about certain goods, 
despite their uniqueness, and thus they can make their decisions based on 
sufficient information. For example, it is not possible to define the taste, the 
fragrance or the characteristic fruity features which are exclusively peculiar to 
given types of wine based on their chemical composition. Distributors often 
do not even experiment with providing information and on the label of the 
bottle they describe a limited number of parameters: alcohol content, sweet 
or dry character and place of origin. It is hard to make grounded decisions 
based on this information. However, even the inexperienced customer makes 
few mistakes if he orients his purchases according to price, since the well-
informed minority circles of experts regularly classify these goods which 
cannot be described in an exact way, and through their coordination a ranking 
of wines which determines value is created. The experts and the trade press 
create a hierarchy of goods for this market segment (Benjamin and Podolny 
1999), which reduces the risk to the customer. The sale price can be increased 
by emphasizing/inventing the tradition of the vine-growing region, as Ulin 
(1995) pointed out in connection with the Bordeaux varietal. 
There are numberless similar market segments, though their features vary. 
They have in common that their prices are not formed by demand and supply 
but are socially constructed. For example, the prices of dresses coming from 
haute couture salons are influenced by a combination of the prestige of the 
fashion house, the trade press and high prestige customers (Aspers 2010). On 
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the market for works of art, the mechanism for price formation is different 
from the above mentioned, but the price of specific pieces is not determined 
by supply and demand but jointly by the opinions of inner circles, the prestige 
of the auction house (the social status of people assembled at the auction, 
the prestige of the press covering the event), and the identity of the former 
owner (Thornton 2008). It seems odd, but within the circle of Gabor Romas in 
Transylvania, the price of silver goblets, originally possessed by the church or 
noble families and which reflect the prestige of the family, develops similarly 
in many respects. The prestige of these objects increases transaction by 
transaction since the prestige of the actual owner is added to the value, so 
the greater the number of owners the higher the price of the object. During 
the transaction an ‘expert team’, consisting of relatives who were involved in 
earlier trades, decides whether the asked-for price, often amounting to 200-
300 thousand USD, should be paid (Berta 2012).
In the case of the rather large group of non-standard goods – construction 
industry services belong here – price-value ratios develop by chance, since 
quality-related information is missing and social validation of value does not 
occur. In the absence of these items, the customers may buy a pig in a poke. 
Uncertainty about transactions stemming from a lack of quality standards 
affects both sellers and buyers in the same way. It is well known from Akerlof’s 
(1970) analysis that, on the market for second-hand cars, the customers’ 
situation is rather risky because of information asymmetry. Customers are 
not protected from buying cars that have been used to excess, or cars with 
undiscovered faults. Here, sellers who offer above-average quality come to 
grief since they cannot reflect their investment in the price, although their cars 
may be in a better technical condition. Consequently, they leave the market, 
which means that even those customers who would willingly pay more for a 
car in a better condition are at a disadvantage. 
At the same time, the mechanism that leads to “lemonization”, as described 
by Akerlof, does not apply to every market segment which lacks clearly 
defined quality parameters. For example, in the construction industry it is 
typical, even in the long run, that entrepreneurs that provide both bad and 
good quality services are equally present; competition does not work to select 
the former; however, the latter will not leave18 despite the fact that in most 
18  In this vocation the non-regulated market has not become well-regulated, unlike in the case of 
language teaching or the wine trade. Development of a hierarchy that informs customers and 
the associated inflation of bad quality goods and services and their removal from markets has 
not happened. This problem cannot be traced back to the regime transition since other markets 
segments have turned into well-regulated markets.
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cases they cannot find a way to capture their extra costs in the prices of the 
services they provide. Thus prices do not scatter according to quality, and price 
indications give false information about the reliability of products and services, 
as described in Akerlof’s model about the early history of the used car market.
For the customer, besides having to deal with non-standardized levels 
of quality, there exists uncertainty related to the future performance of the 
seller (DiMaggio and Louch 1998), which is especially significant in the 
construction industry. According to our interviewees a well-used tactic 
of builders, tilers, plumber entrepreneurs, etc. is that they direct all their 
employees to a recently-undertaken construction or flat renovation site. They 
keep working at full capacity until they reach the point where the customer is 
completely committed; that is, he can only change partners at a significant cost 
in time and hassle. Reaching that point the contractor leaves the construction 
site, leaving only one or two ‘dispensable’ craftsmen, and the team start work 
for a newer customer at full capacity. Using this tactic, entrepreneurs manage 
at their customers’ expense to play for time and do not even turn down those 
customers whom they should, because of their lack of capacity. 
The question is how sellers and buyers can succeed on this risky market 
characterized by misinformation. In the next section of our paper we reveal 
the answer. 
The buyers’ strategy: intensive search  
– transactions among each other
A large number of market segments (the construction industry, health care, 
cleaning, baby-sitting, etc.) resemble the bazaar trade, as described by Geertz 
(1992). Their common feature is that information regarding prices, the quality 
of services and the discipline of payment is limited and poorly distributed 
and communicated. Consequently, information is highly precious. In this 
situation intensive searching is typical; the attention of buyers covers only a 
few products and services but they thoroughly examine these items and they 
collect information mostly about sellers by making use of their networks19. 
Geertz contrasts intensive searching with extensive (survey-type searching) 
which happens when goods are standardized. On a product market customers 
strive to find the greatest possible number of sellers and are able to select the 
most favorable products from a suitably-large sample of offers.  
19  Di Maggio and Louch (1998) call the searching which happens through making use of 
networks “search embeddedness”.
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It is common with redecoration projects that craftsmen are not selected on 
open markets – not selected, for example, via advertisements – and nor are they 
selected using prices; that is, there is no survey-type search, but prospective 
buyers try to orient themselves about the competence and trustworthiness of 
the service provider with the help of acquaintances. Our interviewees, being 
customers (when they are searching for subcontractors), proceed similarly and 
as sellers are selected this way by their customers. One of our interviewees, a 
distributor of steel sections and steel plates for construction, uses his country-
wide circle of acquaintances to filter out unreliable buyers. A certain practice 
has developed with the retailing of building material – entrepreneurs typically 
do not immediately pay for goods that are purchased, but only after they have 
generated some income using these materials20. This practice is misused by a 
number of people; they take materials and do not pay according to the terms of 
purchasing; moreover, a few of them do not pay at all. Thus, the seller’s risk is 
fairly large, but it can be reduced by collecting information about customers. 
According to one of our interviewees, he is able to find out almost everything 
about anyone with the help of his wide circle of acquaintances (including ex 
fellow-soldiers, school mates, colleagues, etc.). With several phone calls he 
can find out to what extent a prospective customer is trustworthy21. 
In the course of our research it came to light that networks are used in 
the search for reliable partners not only in the SME (Small and Medium 
Size Enterprise) sector but also in the case of larger companies. Our 
interviewees stated that they had got orders from large companies such as 
MOL (Hungarian Oil and Gas Company), Siemens, T-mobile, Philip Morris 
and DÉMÁSZ (South Hungarian Electricity Supplier Plc.). They had also got 
recommendations through their personal relationships. During the research 
the complex system of recommendations became clearer; exchange and 
selling transactions were happening almost exclusively through the use of 
personal relationships. 
Economic actors use their networks not only to search and obtain 
information, but they also make efforts to manage their transactions inside 
their circle of acquaintances. DiMaggio and Louch (1998) empirically-
support their proposition that people purchase non-standardized goods of 
20  This phenomenon is characteristic of the entire construction industry, thus chain debt mainly 
develops here. 
21  In the presented case the information asymmetry is the opposite of, for example, the used car 
market, but this does not change the essence of the problem. Either the seller or the buyer 
can possesses additional information; the other party can improve his situation through an 
embedded search. 
137THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AND THE MARKET
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2014) 
high value as far as possible from relatives, friends and from their friends’ 
friends, thereby reducing the risk of transactions. According to our research 
experiences, this kind of use of networks is characteristic not only of the 
consumer market but also of transactions between entrepreneurs. 
Since Coleman’s work (1988) it has been well known that there is a kind 
of resource that can be accessed through relationships, yet there is less talk of 
its’ risk-reducing role in the uncertain quality goods market. Perhaps it was 
Landa (1994) who emphasized most clearly that in an uncertain regulatory 
environment (where the law pertaining to financial matters is underdeveloped), 
relationships (ethnic relations) serve to reduce the risk of transactions, and 
correspondingly the cost of transactions. However, the fields of culture and 
regulatory environments examined by Landa (and the current authors) stand 
in sharp contrast; there is one general rule that seems to exist: whatever the 
reason for the uncertainty, economic actors strive to make their transactions 
with actors from their circle of acquaintances. When transactions are not 
occasional but recurring (the cases examined by DiMaggio and Louch were 
of this type), then relations take the form of well structured circles.
Lasting forms of co-operation develop between representatives of the 
complementary construction industry trades (they carry out orders together, 
refer customers to each other, etc.) and entrepreneurs who were unknown 
earlier can enter these circles only via recommendation. On the other hand, 
these groups are not closed, as people within networks place orders with 
others outside their network. Those interviewees who proved to be most 
successful were members of various circles that co-operated with each 
other. They belonged to three or four circles and they were the least affected 
by the crises in the construction industry. Belonging to a given circle not 
only ensures a predictable outcome for a co-operative effort (for example, 
efficiency-increasing specialization), but it also decreases the uncertainty 
that accompanies non-standardized services. Our conversation partners laid 
stress on the following major benefit of their networks: they help avoid 
the free-riders who represent various trades and who work together on the 
same construction sites or redecoration projects. For example, a free-rider 
might use lower-quality material than that ordered, assuming that this will 
remain undetected if others do their jobs correctly, or might perform a task 
in the easiest way, not caring about making life more difficult for others. 
Furthermore, the problem that some entrepreneurs, following exclusively 
their own self-interest, will perform their tasks at the most convenient times 
for them, or will leave a project for the sake of a better offer thereby disrupting 
others’ schedules, may be avoided. 
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Thus the system of recommendations significantly decreases the costs of 
searching which are otherwise high on the non-standardized goods market, 
since supply is difficult to assess. Moreover, the cost of entering into a 
contract also decreases since the network guarantees quality jobs without 
written contracts. The fact that entrepreneurs who know each other work 
together on a given construction site or redecoration project is advantageous 
in terms of organizing and timing tasks and coordinating activities, since they 
are able to adapt flexibly to changing situations. 
The strategy of sellers
If the buyers who search intensively are not able to get information about 
the quality of non-standardized goods for any reason, then the same thing 
happens to them as happened to Buridan’s donkey. That is, they will not be 
able to choose between things which are seemingly identical, due to the lack 
of information (Gambetta 1994). They may try to solve this problem using 
external means (e.g. by throwing a dice); however, this process is liable to 
result in rather dubious outcomes with bazaar trade type markets where similar 
looking goods might be considerably different in terms of durability or utility.
Can sellers that offer truly good quality goods and services help their 
customers to choose? According to Gambetta, they can: they will endeavor 
to establish a personal reputation. In the author’s example, retailers and 
restaurant owners will employ the services of mafia-type groups which are 
most able to make them believe that they are indeed able to provide efficient 
protection. This symbolic form of capital may play a significant role on non-
standardized markets when choosing psychiatrists, attorneys and plumbers, 
or, if you like, restaurants. 
Among the entrepreneurs in our sample there were three who had been 
contacted by their customers primarily because of their reputations, and 
getting orders through recommendations came second. One of them (who 
makes brick tiles) has managed to establish a country-wide reputation. Since 
he is held in esteem, despite the crisis he is often invited to participate in 
construction projects for demanding buildings that are intended to be of 
above average quality. He proudly related that on the occasion of a recent 
order he worked for a notable company in a large city (Szeged) and he was 
invited there based on his reputation. Moreover, he does a lot to promote his 
company’s brand; he participates on a regular basis at Construma which is 
the largest trade fair in Hungary (International Building Trade Exhibition), 
and he also exhibits his sample walls in several building material shops. 
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The other entrepreneur is also a tiler; he has managed to create a regional 
level reputation and can reference works like tiling the operating theatre of 
a hospital. Investors who need high quality tiling or flagstones put down in 
the neighborhood of his residence (a circle of approximately 70 kilometers’ 
radius from Budapest to Cegléd) would most likely commission him. The 
third entrepreneur is a tile stove builder. He has not been in the trade for a 
long time so when he started building his reputation, he compiled an album of 
photos depicting his earlier work, amongst other means. 
With the rest of our interviewees, recommendations are significant for 
getting orders; however, at the same time ‘quality’ is a word that prevailed 
in their narratives. They talked often and long about this topic without being 
asked. One of them described the importance of quality for at least a quarter 
of the time of the (one and a half hour) interview. The most successful 
entrepreneurs who have a reputation in their trades are indeed held in esteem 
by architects and the retailers of building materials, from whom they often 
get their orders.  
SOME  FINAL COMMENTS 
The most important lesson that emerges from our research is that, in contrast 
to other sectors of the economy, the construction industry did not move away 
from an initial ‘natural’ state of chaos towards a well-structured state after 
the transition. The reason for this is fourfold. There exist: (1) self-employed 
repair and maintenance individuals who satisfy local demand; (2) networks 
of small and medium-size entrepreneurs that cooperate with each other and 
are present on the national market; (3) some big companies, to which; (4) 
‘roaming’ enterprises (those excluded from networks), are connected. Besides 
political corruption, the behavior of larger firms is also governed by the 
regulatory environment which often acts in their favor. The law and local 
regulations do not sufficiently regulate the activities of the self-employed 
who belong to small and medium-size enterprises. As a consequence, they do 
not have adequate protection against various risks (e.g. uncertainty related to 
chain debt). In this sector those enterprises which work as part of a network 
seem to be more successful because a system of tacit agreements that has 
developed within their relationships makes their transactions safer. 
In summary, networks play a significant role in the construction industry. 
A significant proportion of the services offered in this market segment could 
only be standardized at significant cost, and the trading of non-standardized 
goods entails a high level of risk. 
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